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Abstract
This paper fills the gap between individual selection models and household approaches to
migration. We build a theoretical model to account for household-based migration decisions
and derive its implications on migrant selection. Assuming that the origin household takes
into account both earnings and future remittances when choosing where to allocate its
members, we show that migrant selection resulting from a household model may differ from
self-selection predicted by an individual model. This paper thus investigates the so far
under-explored issue of intra-household selection into migration in order to identify the key
determinants of household members’ location choices. The estimation procedure is derived
from an extension of the Roy-Dahl model of mobility and earnings and is applied to a
unique matched sample of Senegalese migrants in three destination countries - France, Italy
and Mauritania - and their origin household in Senegal. Our results show that expected
remittances, along with earnings differentials, play a major role in shaping intra-household
selection patterns, which stands in striking contrast with the usual predictions derived from
individual self-selection models.
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1 Introduction
The question of the characteristics that differentiate individuals who migrate from those who
stay in their home country is still a major issue in the migration literature. Migrant selection
has indeed been studied in many articles since the seminal paper by Borjas (1987) who applied
to international migration the Roy (1951) model of self-selection. In this theoretical framework,
location choices depend on individuals’ comparative advantages based on both their observed
and unobserved characteristics. All the papers derived from the Roy model of self-selection thus
explicitly share an individual-based approach, in line with the first models of migration as an
individual income-maximizing strategy (Harris and Todaro (1970); Sjaastad (1962)).
While the household dimension of migration decisions has been acknowledged since the
1980s by a large strand of literature, initiated in particular by Stark and Bloom (1985), it has
been mostly used to enrich the understanding of remittances behaviors, beyond mere altruism.
However, no paper has yet investigated the implications of a household migration decision on
migrant selection. Yet, if migration is regarded as the result of a household welfare-maximizing
strategy and thus decided on at the household level, the selection of one or more migrants among
household members may not be equivalent to individual self-selection into migration. Indeed,
future remittances to non-migrant members may be part of the household decision-making
process at the migration stage, jointly with comparative advantages in earnings. This paper is
thus the first to explicitly model the implications of a household-based migration decision on
migrant selection, and to put a special emphasis on the role of expected remittances. This issue
is indeed ignored in the migration literature which is either focused on selection as a purely
individual process or on remittances as the result of a household strategy, while assuming that
the migration decision is exogenous.
One reason why intra-household selection into migration has not been studied to date prob-
ably lies in the lack of suitable data. Indeed, in order to uncover the main factors that shape
selection patterns within the household, one needs to compare counterfactual allocations of
household members across alternative locations, accounting for the non-random double selec-
tion of who migrates and where. To control for this double selection, information on the
characteristics of both migrant and non-migrant members originating from the same origin
household is required. We exploit in this paper unique matched survey data collected among
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Senegalese migrants in three host countries and members of their origin household who remained
in Senegal. The structure of these data make them particularly appropriate for the analysis of
intra-household selection.
This article thus contributes to fill a major gap in the migration literature by providing
and estimating a household model for migrant selection using unique migrant-origin household
matched data. We specifically address the issue of intra-household selection into migration and
aim at answering the following questions: who, among household members, is more likely to
migrate and what are the key determinants of household-based migration decisions?
We first build a general theoretical model to account for the household allocation decision.
We assume that the household chooses where to allocate its members and that this choice results
from the maximization of a household utility function that depends on expected household
members’ earnings at each location and future remittances sent by each potential migrant.
We derive theoretical predictions about migrant selection and show in particular that intra-
household variations in remittances potential, along with earnings differentials across members,
play a key role in the household migration decision.
Second, we derive from our theoretical setting an extended Roy model of intra-household
mobility. To recover the structural parameters of our model of household migration decision, we
suggest a three-step estimation procedure of a discrete choice model of location choices based on
the model developed by Dahl (2002), extended to a household-level joint selection process with
multiple alternatives. We then provide an empirical application using unique survey data on
Senegalese migrants and members from their origin households in Senegal. These data, collected
in 2009-2010 as part of the MIDDAS project, provide information on migrants’ characteristics
in the top three destination countries of Senegalese migrants (France, Italy, and Mauritania) as
well as detailed information on all members of their origin household in Senegal. We collected in
particular information on earnings of migrants in host countries and non-migrants in Senegal,
and on remittances sent by migrants to their origin household. Our results show that both
earnings and remittances differentials play a role in shaping intra-household selection patterns.
We find that the household selects into migration the member with the highest remittances
potential, conditional on earnings. This finding enriches the usual predictions of individual self-
selection models, and allows us to account for the fact that household members with koranic
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education or who are the eldest of their siblings both have higher migration propensities and
remit larger amounts, despite having no comparative advantages in earnings.
The household-based framework that we adopt is particularly relevant to the Senegalese
migration context under study. Indeed, according to our data, 56% of surveyed migrants covered
part or totality of migration costs through family funding which indicates that migration is a
household investment. Furthermore, the data show evidence of the strength of the links between
migrants and their origin household. More than 80% of surveyed migrants send remittances to
their origin households, mostly on a regular (monthly) basis. The average amount of remittances
account for between 15% and 30% of migrants’ monthly income depending on host countries and
amounts to a large share of the resources of recipient households. In addition, remitted amounts
are primarily used for daily consumption - 84% of money transfers - in order to cover the basic
needs of all household members - 78% of money transfers are indeed targeted to the household
as a whole for collective expenditures. Finally, around 60% of sampled migrants state their
intention to return to Senegal, mostly in their origin household. These figures therefore indicate
that, in spite of the geographical distance, both non-migrants and migrants remain part of a
“transnational” household in which at least part of the resources are pooled and support our
choice of a unitary model of household decision-making. These empirical findings additionally
suggest that remittances cannot be fully explained by a risk-sharing strategy.
This paper thus fills a gap between the literature on migrant selection, exclusively focused
on self-selection of immigrants as an individual process (Chiswick (1999), Orrenius and Za-
vodny (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011), Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga (2013), among others), and other strands of the migration literature which
have acknowledged the household dimension of the migration decision, but mainly through the
lens of remittances motives (see Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a review). Note that a first
attempt to investigate the impact of the family on migrant selection can be found in Borjas
and Bronars (1991). However, their model does not really depart from an individual selection
approach. Since their theoretical results are based on the simplifying assumption that house-
holds do not split, they do not account for remittances and fail to address most of the issues
related to household migration decisions. For many developing countries, including Senegal, the
assumption that the household does not split is overly restrictive.
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The empirical part of the paper builds on Dahl (2002) who enriched the theoretical two-
sector self-selection model inherited from Roy (1951) by allowing for multiple alternatives. The
same methodology has been applied by De Vreyer et al. (2010) to the analysis of location choices
in West African capital cities, and by Bertoli et al. (2013) to the migration of Ecuadorians to
Spain and the U.S. However, all these papers study individual location decisions. We contribute
to this strand of literature by adapting Dahl’s individual theoretical framework to the modelling
of household migration decisions. This article also contributes to the estimation of non-standard
conditional logit models. Indeed, since we explore within-household allocation choices of mem-
bers, the set of alternatives available to each household depends on the number of potential
migrant members in the household. To date, only a few papers, with applications to marketing
(Berry et al. (2004), Allenby and Rossi (1998)) or electoral choices (Yamamoto, 2012), have de-
veloped estimation techniques of conditional logit models with a number of alternatives varying
across observations
Finally, this paper is one of the few empirical studies exploiting the rich information con-
tained in matched data samples of migrants and origin households. The same survey design is
found in Osili (2007) who studies the determinants of remittances of Nigerian migrants in the
U.S., but the resulting matched sample is only made of 61 pairs of migrants and families of
origin. A similar data structure is obtained by Abramitzky et al. (2012) and Ambler (2012), al-
though constructed with very different methodologies. In the first case, the authors exploit data
on individuals’ names and ages from the 1865 and 1900 Norwegian and the 1900 US censuses
to link Norwegian migrants to their childhood household and investigate returns to migration
experience among siblings. In the second case, the author designed a controlled experiment
to assess the role of information asymmetries between Salvadoran migrants in Washington and
their origin household, during which family members back in Salvador were reached by phone
and asked very specific questions related to the experiment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a household-based model for migration and
derives an extension of the Roy model of selection. Section 3 outlines the estimation procedure.
Data are described in Section 4. Empirical specification and identification issues are discussed
in Section 5. Estimation results are then presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a structural model for household-based migration decisions. We
assume that household members’ location choices are decided on at the origin household level
so as to maximize a household utility function depending on both earnings and remittances.
We derive predictions regarding migrant selection. We then build on Dahl (2002) to define an
extended Roy model of intra-household selection and suggest a three step estimation procedure
to recover the structural parameters of our model of household migration decision.
2.1 A household model of migration decision
We consider a household made of several members whose geographical allocation is decided on
at the household level. Each member can migrate to one of the available destination countries or
stay in the home country. We make the following two preliminary assumptions. First, we con-
sider only households participating in migration. Indeed, this paper focuses on intra-household
selection, that is to say, on the simultaneous choice of which member is to migrate and live
abroad and its destination once the household decision to participate in migration has been
taken1. Second, for the sake of simplicity, and consistent with the empirical estimation, we
ignore the fact that households can have several migrants2.
General setting
We consider an origin household h made of n members who can migrate to J possible
destination countries. Mhij is a dummy variable equal to one if member i of household h
migrates to country j and all other members stay in the home country3. We define the utility
of each member at her relevant location as a function of individual earnings abroad and sent
remittances if she migrates, or pooled home country earnings and received remittances if she
1Moreover, this choice is consistent with the following empirical application and the structure of the matched
sample that we use, which is exclusively made of migrant households (see section 4).
2Modelling household migration decisions while allowing for several migrants is left for further research. Note
that more than 60% of origin households that were successfully tracked reported the surveyed migrant as being
their only member abroad. For households with more than one migrant, however, the survey questionnaire does
not record detailed information on other migrants from the same origin household. Yet, the following empirical
results are robust, though less precise due to the small size of the resulting sample, to the exclusion of households
with multiple international migrants.
3In the following empirical analysis, we restrict the pool of potential migrants to working-age household
members.
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stays in the origin household. Remittances sent by the migrant member enter the (n−1) utility
functions of non-migrant members positively. We additionally assume that the latter equally
benefit from received amounts4. Conversely, we assume that remittances enter the migrant’s own
utility negatively, and that they are discounted by a positive and lower than one factor reflecting
any indirect or deferred individual utility derived from remittances5. Therefore, depending on
the migration status of member i, her individual utility Ui writes:
Ui(Mhij) = Ui
[
(1−Mhij)
(∑
m 6=k Yms +Rkj
(n− 1)
)
+Mhij(Yij − δiRij)
]
∀i, j and k 6= i (1)
where Ui is a concave and twice differentiable utility function. Yms stands for earnings of
member m in home country s and Yij for earnings of member i in destination country j, Rij
refers to remittances sent by migrant member i from host country j and Rkl to remittances
received from migrant member k in host country j. δi is an individual-specific discount factor
with 0 < δi < 1.
The closer δi is to 0, the lower the negative effect of remittances in the migrant’s direct utility.
Intuitively, in the extreme case where δi is equal to 0, the implied loss for the migrant in her
direct individual utility is totally compensated by the indirect utility derived from remittances
to the home country: remittances do not affect the migrant’s own welfare. In the polar case
where it is equal to 1, remitted amounts basically translate into lower disposable income at
destination for the migrant. Note that δi may encompass any motive for remittances from which
the migrant derives positive but indirect or deferred utility. It might involve any exchange of
services between the migrant and her origin household, the “warm glow” of taking care of those
left behind through altruism or commitment to solidarity norms, or any form of deferred benefits
and social prestige associated with migration and remittances upon return. The δi parameter
will be crucial in the following analysis through its dual effect on transferred amounts and on
the discounted loss in the migrant member’s direct utility that it induces.
4This might be too strong an assumption if remittances are targeted to specific recipients within the house-
hold for private use. It is nevertheless relevant in our context where remittances are mostly designed to the
whole household to cover collective expenditures. This assumption is moreover consistent with the findings by
De Vreyer et al. (2009) on a representative sample of Senegalese households. They find that remittances used
for daily consumption benefit all household members equally. The assumption of income pooling within the
origin household is extended to non-migrant members earnings. However the predictions of the model remain
unchanged if we assume that earnings are not pooled.
5We could also consider the case of money transfers from the origin household to the migrant. However this
case is ignored since according to our data only 0,4% of migrants received money from their family in Senegal.
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We then define the household’s total utility Uh as an additively separable function of the
weighted sum of each household member’s individual utility plus a migrant-specific taste factor:
Uh(Mhij) =
n∑
i=1
θiUi(Mhij) + Th(Mhij) ∀i, j (2)
where θi is the individual weight of member i in the household utility, with
∑
θi = 1. An
alternative interpretation of these welfare weights is that they represent the bargaining power of
each household member in the intra-household allocation process. The additional taste factor
Th aims at capturing the non-monetary determinants entering the total utility function. It
includes in particular migration costs and any other non-monetary or psychic costs and benefits
for household h of having member i in country j. Note that the taste component is also a
weighted sum of migrants’ and non migrants’ costs and benefits6.
We choose to represent the household migration decision in a unitary model that can be
characterized by a consensus model a la Samuelson (1956). Each member has specific prefer-
ences but these preferences are interrelated by a consensus that takes into account the welfare
of other household members. In other words, household members agree on a common objective
and then act as if they were maximizing a well-behaved (Bergsonian) social welfare function.
In our model, we consider that individual migration and remittances decisions are interrelated
and decided on at the household level in order to maximize the above defined household utility7.
Optimal amount of remittances
From the expression in equation (2), the utility for household h associated with having
member i in country j and all other members in the home country s writes:
Uhij = Uh(Mhij = 1)
=
∑
k 6=i
θkUk
(∑
k 6=i Yks +Rij
(n− 1)
)
+ θiUi (Yij − δiRij) + Thij ∀i, j (3)
6However, since our focus is on the relative role of earnings and remittances in the household decision, we
leave the structural form of the taste component unspecified.
7Although such unitary models have been criticized first because the mechanism that leads to an agreement
within the household remains unspecified and second because it somehow ignores household members’ own
rational preferences, as noted by Samuelson, it is particularly relevant in the case where household total resources
are properly broken down into pre-specified shares so that the primary objective is to maximize the total (earnings)
surplus. The only consensus decision to be made then relates to the allocation of the household surplus among
members.
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We consider that earnings and tastes at each location as well as parameters such as individual-
specific bargaining powers and discount factors on remittances are exogenously given and known
to all household members, or at least accurately expected conditional on the observed character-
istics of members and locations8. On the other hand, in our model, the amount of remittances
sent back to the origin household by each potential migrant is endogenously determined so as
to maximize the household total utility. Hence, the optimal amount of remittances R∗ij sent by
migrant i living in country j should satisfy the following first order condition:
∂Uhij
∂Rij
=
∑
k 6=i
θk
(n− 1)U
′
k
(∑
k 6=i Yks +R
∗
ij
(n− 1)
)
− θiδiU ′i
(
Yij − δiR∗ij
)
= 0 ∀i, j (4)
By differentiating the previous equality with respect to each parameter (see Appendix A),
it can first be shown that the optimal amount of remittances R∗ij is unsurprisingly an increasing
function of migrant’s earnings at destination Yij and a decreasing function of non-migrants’
earnings in the home country Yks. Conditional on household members’ total earnings, R
∗
ij is also
a decreasing function of the remittances discount factor δi. This last finding is quite intuitive:
at the household level, when δi is lower than one and small enough, the marginal gain from each
additional unit of remittances in non-migrants’ utilities outbalances the concurrent marginal loss
in the migrant’s utility, therefore inducing an increase in the equilibrium amount of remittances.
Overall, these predictions provide a first rationale for household-based migration choices to
differ from pure individual self-selection based on earnings differentials. Indeed, conditional on
members’ individual earnings, intra-household variations in the δi parameter could well play an
additional role in the household migration decision through induced individual variations in the
propensity to remit larger amounts.
Note also that R∗ij is a decreasing function of the bargaining power of migrant i, θi, and
an increasing function of the bargaining powers of non-migrants, θk. However, the previous
predictions are robust to different specifications of these individual bargaining powers. Their
specific role in the migrant selection process is further discussed in the following sections.
Intra-household selection into migration
8We further assume that bargaining powers and discount factors are pre-determined at the time when mobility
decisions are taken. They are thus assumed not to be endogenous to migration.
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From the above determined optimal amount of the remittances sent by migrant member
i, the corresponding value Vhij of the utility function for household h of sending member i in
destination country j and having all other members stay in the home country s writes:
Vhij = Uhij(R
∗
ij) =
∑
k 6=i
θkUk
(∑
k 6=i Yks +R
∗
ij
n− 1
)
+ θiUi
(
Yij − δiR∗ij
)
+ Thij ∀i, j (5)
Since any of the n household member can migrate in one of the J destination countries, the
household’s problem then boils down to choosing among n × J alternatives the geographical
allocation of its members that maximizes the value of its utility. Household h thus decides to
locate member i in country j according to:
Mhij =
 1 if Vhij = max(Vh11, ..., Vh1J , ..., Vhn1, ..., VhnJ)0 otherwise (6)
From the expression in equation (5), through application of the envelope theorem (see Ap-
pendix B), we show that, conditional on welfare weights and migration costs and tastes, the
value of the household utility at the remittances optimum is first an increasing function of
the migrant’s earnings at destination, Yij , and an increasing function of non-migrant members’
earnings in the home country, Yks. This last prediction indirectly reflects the fact that the
opportunity cost of sending a member with high earnings at home is larger. Therefore, what
precisely matters in the household decision is the comparative advantage in earnings across lo-
cations among potential migrant members, that is to say the difference between (Ykj−Yks) and
(Yij − Yis) for two different members k and i. Put differently, the household thus selects into
migration the member with the highest earnings differential between host and home countries.
Second, the optimal value of the household utility is a decreasing function of the remittances
discount parameter δi. This is again intuitive, since for small enough δi, the marginal loss
from remittances in the migrant member’s welfare in the destination country is offset at the
household level by the induced marginal gains in the non-migrant members’ welfare in the home
country. Together with the related and above stated effect of δi on remitted amounts, this result
merely puts forward the fact that, conditional on earnings differentials, welfare weights and
tastes, household members with a higher propensity to remit have a higher probability of being
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selected into migration. Note that the double effect of δi on remittances and the propensity to
migrate basically results from the induced discounted marginal loss from transferred amounts
in the migrant’s utility. As a consequence, the interaction between δi and individual remitted
amounts has a key role in the selection process, as implicitly shown in equation (5). This last
point is crucial to identification of the role of remittances potentials in the following empirical
analysis and is further discussed in the next subsection.
Third, the optimal value of the household utility is found to be an increasing function of both
migrant and non-migrants’ bargaining powers {θi, θk}. Hence, the higher the relative weight
of member i’s utility in the household utility, the higher her probability of being selected into
migration. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the followings that bargaining powers are
equal. Indeed, as bargaining powers only affect the allocation of welfare within the household,
allowing them to differ across household members does not challenge the main predictions of
our theoretical model9.
2.2 An extended Roy model of intra-household selection
In the rest of the paper, we test the relevance of our theoretical model to account for ob-
served patterns of intra-household selection into migration and investigate the responsiveness of
household members’ location choices to both individual earnings differentials and remittances
potentials.
First, we take a linear approximation of the above defined household utility function to allow
tractable estimation of the structural parameters driving location choices. Second, we assume
that household members have accurate expectations about individual earnings, remittances and
tastes, based on observable characteristics of each member and location10. Third, we consider
that welfare weights are equal across household members. The value Vhij of the household
9Still, this last remark intuitively suggests that the respective role of individual earnings differentials and
remittances potentials in the migration decision might vary according to differences in individual welfare weights
within the household. In the following empirical analysis, we nevertheless did not find evidence of such an
heterogeneity with respect to different proxy measures of bargaining powers within the household, lending further
support to the equality assumption in our setting. A detailed discussion is provided in Section 6.3.
10This might be too strong an assumption since migrant earnings and remittances are only observed ex-post
by the household. Moreover, information asymmetries may exist between the migrant and the origin household,
due in particular to geographical distance. However, this assumption simplifies the analysis and, as noted by
Dahl (2002), adding uncertainty to the Roy setting so that migration is based on expected utility maximization
does not affect the main insights of the model.
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random utility of locating member i in country j can then be written:
V˜hij = α(
∑
yks + yij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Earnings
component
+ β(1− δi)rij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remittances
component
+ γjtij︸︷︷︸
Taste
component
+ hij ∀i, j (7)
with:
yks = E(Yks|xk); yij = E(Yij |xi); rij = E(Rij |xi); tij = E(Thij |zij)
where xk is a set of characteristics of non-migrant member k affecting home earnings, xi is a
set of characteristics of migrant i affecting destination earnings and remittances, zij is a vector
of migrant i and destination j characteristics affecting tastes and hij is an error term.
Following our theoretical framework, the remittances discount factor δi can be approximated
by a subset x1i of individual characteristics xi that affect remittances amounts conditional on
the household earnings surplus. As such, note that the whole remittances component (1− δi)rij
could be regarded as a simple reduced-form function f(x1i) of those characteristics. Yet, to
the extent that such characteristics also influence tastes tij , they would then stand for a mixed
component of remittances and tastes. Therefore, further assessing their effect in interaction
with expected remittances amounts, as it appears in the structural form of the utility, will allow
to disentangle and identify the role of remittances and tastes in the selection process, once
earnings are properly taken into account11. Finally, note that allowing welfare weights to differ
across household members would simply introduce additional heterogeneity in the structural
parameters α and β with respect to relevant measures of individual bargaining powers. This
potential heterogeneity is tested and ruled out in the empirical application that follows.
The utility function consists of two parts: a deterministic mean component, which is a
function of individual and location (observed) characteristics and a stochastic (unobserved)
component which stands for household members’ deviations from mean earnings, remittances
and tastes12. The set of parameters {α, β, γj}, which represents the relative weights of each
factor in the above utility, is assumed to be identical across households. Moreover, while the
11Intuitively, if the x1i proxies for δi were only capturing a taste effect, they should play no role through remit-
tances differentials. Hence, identifying the latter effect comes down to empirically investigating the heterogeneous
effect of remittances with respect to those proxies.
12The stochastic component is a complex sum of household members’ individual-specific error terms. This
point, as well as the choice of a functional form for expected earnings, remittances and tastes are further developed
in Section 3.1.
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γj parameters are location-specific to account for destination-specific costs or benefits of migra-
tion, the set of parameters {α, β} is further assumed to be homogenous across locations. Put
differently, any increase in labor market earnings or remittances provides identical utility gains
or losses, whatever the country of residence13.
Considering that the household selects among n×J alternatives the geographical allocation
of its members that maximizes the value of its random utility, the intra-household selection
equations in (6) can alternatively be written as:
Mhij =
 1 if V˜hij > V˜hkl ∀(k, l) 6= (i, j)0 otherwise (8)
where Mhij is a dummy variable which is equal to one if member i from household h lives in
destination country j and all remaining members k stay in the home country. The selection
rule is such that non-migrant members’ home earnings, migrant’s earnings and remittances are
only observed for the allocation choice that maximizes the household utility14. Equations (7)
and (8) therefore define an extended Roy model of location choices, such as in Dahl (2002), the
difference with Dahl (2002) being that in our model location choices result from a household
utility-maximizing strategy.
2.3 Estimation issues
Since this paper aims at investigating which component of the household utility mostly drives
location choices, we are particularly interested in estimating the set of structural parameters
{α, β, γj} from equation (7), which is equivalent to estimating a within-household discrete choice
model of members’ location depending on earnings and remittances. Such an estimation raises
two main challenges.
13As noted by De Vreyer et al. (2010), this might be too strong an assumption if large differences exist between
countries in the set of available goods and their prices (for instance public services), so that the living standards
of individuals with equal incomes but residing in different country would be indirectly impacted. However,
we can plausibly assume that households are not in a position to take this dimension into account in their
utility. Moreover, earnings will be converted into Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) units in the following empirical
application, to allow relevant inter-country comparisons.
14Formally, each household h faces a n × J number of alternatives, so that n × J binary variables Mhkl can
actually be defined, corresponding to n × J selection equations. Mhij equals one if alternative {ij} is chosen
and observed; consequently all the remaining Mhkl equal 0 since, by construction, only one allocation can be
chosen. In other words, exactly one of the binary variables Mh11, ...,Mh1J , ...,Mhn1, ...,MhnJ is non-zero for each
household.
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A first identification issue stems from the fact that earnings and remittances are only ob-
served at one location for each household member. To identify the determinants of the household
location choices, we therefore need to compute counterfactual earnings and remittances for each
household member at each location15. However, a selection bias may result from the fact that
households choosing a specific utility-maximizing geographical allocation are not a random sub-
sample of the population. In other words, selected migrants and non-migrants are likely to have
specific observed and unobserved characteristics that simultaneously drive migration, earnings
and remittances. “Naive” imputations based on earnings and remittances equations uncorrected
for endogenous selection would then yield biased results. As a consequence, earnings and remit-
tances for other locations must be imputed, taking into account the fact that location choices
are not random but partially driven by observed and unobserved characteristics explaining earn-
ings and remittances gaps. To solve this identification issue, we apply a three-step parametric
estimation procedure derived from the semi-parametric method developed by Dahl (2002) and
compute counterfactuals that correct for selection biases.
A second estimation issue lies in the fact that households are not necessarily of equal size16.
As a consequence, the number of potential migrant members varies across households. Each
household is actually faced with a varying number of alternatives, each corresponding to the
location of one specific member in one specific destination country. We thus need to estimate
a within-household multiple choice model which takes into account variations in the size of
the choice set across households. A few implementations of such non-standard multiple choice
models can be found in the marketing literature, to estimate market shares of products’ brands
that are not available to every consumer from different regions (see Allenby and Rossi (1998)
or Berry et al. (2004)), or in the political science literature, to analyze electoral choices within
partially contested multiparty elections in which some parties do not run candidates in every
district (see Yamamoto (2012)). We build on these papers to develop an estimation procedure
based on a (within-household) conditional logit model of location choices with a varying number
of alternatives, which is extensively described in the following section.
15We need to compute counterfactual earnings of migrants in the home country, had they not migrated, and
counterfactuals earnings and remittances of both migrants and non-migrants in each possible destination country,
had they migrated (for non-migrants) or, for migrants, had they migrated in another destination country than
the one in which they were surveyed.
16However, the number of possible destinations for potential migrants is considered fixed.
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3 Estimation strategy
We present in this section our three-step parametric estimation procedure of an extended Roy-
Dahl model of intra-household selection into migration. We first estimate a reduced-form con-
ditional logit model of intra-household location choices with a varying number of alternatives.
Second, results from the first-stage estimation are used to estimate individual earnings and re-
mittances equations corrected for endogenous selection. Third, based on the second step results,
we compute counterfactual earnings and remittances predictions to recover the unbiased earn-
ings and remittances structural parameters by estimating a structural-form conditional logit
model of location choices.
Expected earnings, remittances and tastes
First, we specify a standard Mincer-type earnings equation for non-migrant household mem-
bers k living in the home country s as:
Yks = x
′
kρs + µks (9)
where xk is a set of individual characteristics of non-migrant member k affecting (home) earnings
and µks is an individual-specific error term. The vector of parameters ρs identifies home country-
specific returns to individual characteristics with respect to earnings.
Second, we specify a standard Mincer-type earnings equation for migrant i in destination
country j as:
Yij = x
′
iρj + ηij ∀j (10)
where xi is a set of characteristics of migrant i affecting (destination) earnings and ηij is an
individual-specific error term. The vector of parameters ρj identifies destination country-specific
returns to individual characteristics with respect to earnings.
Third, we similarly define a remittances equation for migrant i living in destination country
j:
Rij = x
′
ipij + νij ∀j (11)
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where xi is a set of characteristics of migrant i affecting the amount of remittances sent back to
the origin household and νij an individual-specific error component. The vector of parameters pij
identifies destination-specific returns to individual characteristics with respect to remittances.
We are particularly interested in investigating individual determinants of remittances amounts.
To this end, we add the migrant’s and non-migrants’ earnings to the vector xi in the remittances
equation in order to identify a subset x1i of individual characteristics that (positively) affect
remittances once earnings are accounted for. This latter subset allows us to identify relevant
proxies for (low) values of the δi parameter, capturing individual variations in the propensity
to remit conditional on the household earnings surplus.
Finally, we specify tastes Thij as a flexible function of migrant i and destination j character-
istics that we denote zij . Many destination-specific variables may enter this taste component,
some of them being potentially unobserved. We sidestep the estimation of the taste component
by introducing country-specific dummies that account for differences in the costs or benefits of
migration across destinations, including for instance moving costs, global standards of living or
differences in public services, institutions and culture. We nevertheless assume that these costs
and benefits may vary across individuals within a particular destination. The vector zij thus
includes a destination dummy λj and a set of interactions with individual characteristics xi .
In the followings, the taste component is thus denoted x′iφj .
Intra-household selection equation
We now substitute the above expressions of Yks, Yij and Rij , together with the flexible
specification of tastes Thij , in equation (7) to get the reduced form of the household random
utility:
V˜hij = α(
∑
k 6=i
x
′
kρs + x
′
iρj) + β(1− δi)(x
′
ipij) + x
′
iφj + hij ∀i, j (12)
where hij = α(
∑
k 6=i µks + ηij) + β(1− δi)νij + ξij and ξij stands for individual deviations from
mean tastes. The stochastic component of the utility is then a (weighted) sum of individual
deviations from mean earnings yks and yij , remittances rij and tastes thij , which are specified
as deterministic functions of individual observable characteristics.
Equation (12), together with the selection rule in equation (8), define an additive random
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utility model. Under the statistical assumption that error components hij are i.i.d and have a
type-1 Extreme Value distribution, the probability Phij that household h locates member i in
country j:
Phij = P (Mhij = 1) = P (V˜hij > V˜hkl) ∀(k, l) 6= (i, j) (13)
can be written:
Phij =
exp[αx
′
i(ρj − ρs) + β(1− δi)(x
′
ipij) + x
′
iφj ]∑n
k=1
∑J
l=1 exp[αx
′
k(ρl − ρs) + β(1− δk)(x
′
kpil) + x
′
kφl]
(14)
Phij is the usual conditional probability derived from a standard conditional logit model
with a n × J number of alternatives corresponding to each possible intra-household choice
of member allocation17. A first characteristic of the model is that the set of reduced-form
parameters is destination-specific but alternative-invariant across choices of the member to
be located at a given destination. Identification then relies on intra-household variations in
individual characteristics of household members. An additional specific feature is that the
reduced-form probability for a member to be selected into migration depends on both his own
individual characteristics and the characteristics of all other potential migrant members within
the household.
As previously noted, an important issue is that households are not of equal size. As a
consequence, the number of potential migrant members n varies across households so that
each household h actually faces nh × J alternatives. If we further assume that the set of
parameters to be estimated is identical across households, we can however easily write both
conditional probabilities and the contribution to the log-likelihood function of a given household-
level observation conditional on the specific number of alternatives available to that household,
as follows:
Lh = ln(Lh) =
nh∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Mhij lnPhij (15)
17Note that V˜hij > V˜hkl writes: α(
∑
k 6=i x
′
kρs) + ... + hij > α(
∑
m 6=k x
′
mρs) + ... + hkl where sums on both
sides of the inequality reduce: −α(x′iρs) + ...+ hij > −α(x
′
kρs) + ...+ hkl and yields the simplified expression in
equation (14). Note that components
∑
k 6=i µks and
∑
m 6=k µms also reduce in the household error term so that
hij (resp. hkl) appears to be a function of individual i (resp. individual k) error terms only. This allows us to
plausibly state the i.i.d assumption in equation (12).
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where nh is the number of potential migrant members in household h, J is the fixed number
of possible destination countries for migrant member i, Mhij is the dummy equal to one if
household h has a member i in country j and Phij the associated conditional probability from
equation (14) but which denominator now depends on a household-specific nh × J number of
allocation choices.
The log-likelihood function for a sample of N households then writes as usual:
LN =
N∑
h=1
Lh =
N∑
h=1
nh∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Mhij lnPhij (16)
Equation (16) generalizes the sample log-likelihood function from a standard conditional logit
model, in which choice sets are allowed to vary across observations. Standard maximization
routines can then be applied to get consistent estimates of the set of reduced-form parameters.
Counterfactual earnings and remittances predictions
Considering that individual unobserved heterogeneity drives the intra-household probabil-
ity of being selected into migration as well as individual earnings and remittances, observed
samples of individuals at a given location are obviously not random. Earnings and remittances
equations thus need to be corrected for endogenous selection so that we can generate consistent
counterfactual predictions.
We apply the selectivity-correction method implemented by Dahl (2002)18. Following Dahl,
we use the results of the above defined multiple choice model to compute, for each household
member, a set of predicted location choice probabilities. A flexible function of these proba-
bilities, denoted λ(phij), is then included as an additional set of regressors in equations (9),
(10) and (11) to correct for selectivity biases. In theory, all choice probabilities could enter the
λ(phij) control function. In practice, to avoid potential multicollinearity issues, Dahl (2002)
suggests to use a high order polynomial of the first-best choice probability, i.e. the probability
of the observed allocation, and a subset of other relevant probabilities. Our implementation
choices are discussed in Section 5.
18For an exhaustive comparison of existing methods for selection bias correction based on a multinomial model,
see Bourguignon et al. (2007). Resorting to Monte Carlo’s simulations, they find that Dahl’s approach is to be
preferred to other commonly used methods such as Lee (1983) or Dubin and McFadden (1984).
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Potential drawbacks of the conditional logit model may be pointed out, and in particular
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. For this reason, a nonparametric
estimation of choice probabilities may be preferred. However, it would require a large number of
observations19. Moreover, Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that, even when the IIA property is
seriously questioned, selection bias corrections based on multinomial models can be considered as
a reasonable alternative when the focus is to consistently estimate a given outcome over selected
populations. Therefore, our results should not be affected by the choice of the conditional logit
model at this stage 20.
Structural model of intra-household location choices
In order to finally recover consistent estimates of the set of structural parameters {α, β}
in the within-household model of location choices, a last step is needed. Using the unbiased
estimates ρˆs, ρˆj and pˆij from the selectivity-corrected earnings and remittances equations, we
compute consistent earnings and remittances counterfactuals for each individual at each pos-
sible location, and then estimate the following structural conditional logit model with nh × J
alternatives:
Phij =
exp[αx
′
i(ρˆj − ρˆs) + β(1− δi)(x
′
ipˆij) + x
′
iφj ]∑nh
k=1
∑J
l=1 exp[α(x
′
kρˆl)− x
′
kρˆs) + β(1− δi)(x
′
kpˆil) + x
′
kφl]
(17)
=
exp[α(yˆij − yˆis) + β(1− δi)rˆij + x′iφj ]∑nh
k=1
∑J
l=1 exp[α(yˆkl − yˆks) + β(1− δk)rˆkl + x′kφl]
Consistent with our theoretical model, the probability of being located abroad first depends
on intra-household variations in expected earnings differentials (yˆij − yˆis) between home and
19The nonparametric method suggested by Dahl (2002) consists in dividing the population into mutually
exclusive cells according to observable characteristics such as gender, age or education. Migration probabilities
are then estimated as the fraction of individuals in the same cell observed in a given country. The same approach
is pursued in Bertoli et al. (2013). In this paper, we rely on the parametric method implemented by De Vreyer
et al. (2010).
20Note that the violation of the IIA assumption could question the use of a conditional logit model at the
next stage, so that estimation methods that relax this assumption might be preferred. For instance, Bertoli
et al. (2013) resort to the estimation of a nested logit that allows for the correlation of individual unobserved
heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate across possible destination countries. In our setting, we could consider
an alternative correlation of unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to choose a given destination across
members of the same household. However, alternative estimation procedures are hardly feasible because of the
additional challenge of dealing with a varying number of alternatives and the limited size of the sample in the
following empirical application.
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relevant destination countries. Second, selection into migration depends on intra-household
variations in remittances potentials. As above stated, this additional selection channel can be
captured through individual variations in relevant proxies x1i for the δi parameter. However,
proxy characteristics for δi and individual controls xi that enter the taste component may
overlap so that reduced-form parameters may not allow us to separately identify both channels.
The introduction of interactions between remittances amounts and proxies for δi allows us to
disentangle their potential joint effect through remittances and tastes. Note that exclusion
restrictions are needed, in particular in steps two and three. Specification and identification
issues are discussed in details in Section 5.
In the rest of the paper, we provide an empirical application using a matched sample of
Senegalese migrants in three different destination countries - France, Italy and Mauritania -
and their origin household in Senegal. The next section presents the data.
4 Data
4.1 The MIDDAS data
This article uses data from the surveys conducted between 2009 and 2010 within the framework
of the MIDDAS project21. . Using Senegal as a case-study, this research project aims at
documenting the links between migration, remittances and development. Most of the existing
studies on migration issues are based on data that are generally truncated: they are indeed
collected either among migrants in host countries, thus providing only indirect and partial
information on origin households, or among households in home countries, giving in this case
very few and imprecise insights on the characteristics of migrants, especially on their earnings
abroad and the remittances they send. The main objective of the MIDDAS project was to build
an original data set matching representative samples of Senegalese migrants in host countries
with their origin household in Senegal, in order to collect accurate information on both “sides”
of migration.
21MIDDAS is a three-year project standing for “Migration and development in Senegal: an empirical analysis
using matched data on Senegalese migrants and their origin households (MIDDAS)” funded by the French Agence
Nationale de la Recherche and the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement. Surveys were designed and carried out
by a research team from the IRD-DIAL (France and Senegal). Fieldwork in Italy was conducted by the Forum
Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’ Imigrazione (FIERI). For further details on the institutional setting
and the global objectives of the MIDDAS project, see http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_enquetes/dial_enquetes_
middas.htm.
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An important contribution of this project is thus the collection of matched and multi-sited
data, on which the subsequent analysis is based.
The data collection was carried out in two successive stages. First, surveys were conducted
among representative samples of Senegalese migrants in the top four destination countries of
Senegalese migrants, namely France, Italy, Mauritania and Coˆte d’Ivoire22. Second, migrants’
origin households were tracked and interviewed in Senegal, thanks to the contacts provided
by the migrants. The migrant questionnaire records in particular precise information on the
migrant’s socio-demographic characteristics, individual earnings and remittances. The same
information was recorded for each resident member of migrants’ origin household in the tracking
survey23.
All origin households were tracked, except those of migrants residing in Coˆte d’Ivoire. We
thus focus the following analysis on the French, Italian and Mauritanian samples which are
composed of 326 migrant-origin household pairs. Table 7 in Appendix presents tracking and
matching statistics by country. Sample representativeness is analyzed in Appendix D.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Characteristics of origin households in Senegal depending on the location of the migrant are
shown in Table 11 in Appendix. Note that the average household size is very large (around
12), and the proportion of working age adults is around 60%. In most households, the pool
of potential migrants is therefore large, which further justifies our choice to investigate intra-
household selection. Finally, although origin households have on average two international
migrants, 64% of them reported having only one member living abroad.
Migrants’ and non migrants’ individual characteristics by location are shown in Table 1. The
non-migrant samples are made of all the non-migrant members of migrants’ origin households.
Migrants are predominantly male, and on average a few years younger than non migrants.
Migrants in France and Italy are much more educated on average than non-migrant members
of their origin household, whereas the educational characteristics of migrants in Mauritania are
22According to the 2012 United Nations Database on international migrants’ stocks. Moreover, according the
last 2002 Senegalese census, migration flows to these four countries accounted for 65% of total emigration flows
from Senegal between 1997 and 2002. These figures exclude the Gambia, due to its peculiar landlocked position
within the Senegalese territory.
23Remittances were thus recorded twice. Importantly enough, we did not find any systematic differences
between sent amounts reported by migrants and received amounts reported by the non-migrant members of their
origin household (Seror, 2012).
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Table 1: Individual characteristics by migrant’s location
France/Italy Mauritania
Non-migrants Migrants t/χ2 Non-migrants Migrants t/χ2
Age 43.8 37.6 -6.2*** 38.6 36.5 -2.1*
Gender (%)
...Male 41.2 79.2
70.1***
41.9 65.7
31.6***
...Female 39.8 20.8 58.1 34.3
Schooling level (%)
...No schooling 40.7 14.9
64.5***
54.3 38.6
27.2***
...Primary 21.6 16.9 29.1 28.7
...Middle School 17.5 18.4 8.5 19.8
...High School and more 20.2 49.8 8.1 12.9
Koranic schooling (%)
...Only 10.1 13.6 3.5** 23.1 30.2 7.1**
...Some 52.4 63.1 10.7*** 51.8 64.3 12.5***
Link to household head (%)
...Son/daughter 24.7 62.9
134.8***
29.8 58.4
165.2***
...Brother/sister 6.3 13.6 4.2 22.7
...Head/spouse 35.2 3.9 32.4 5.8
...Other 33.8 19.6 33.6 13.1
Eldest (%)
...Son/daughter 35.8 64.2 28.4*** 41.3 59.7 18.4***
...Brother/sister 27.2 72.8 45.6*** 25.4 74.6 49.2***
Migration funding (%)
...Family / 60.5 / 52.1
...Own savings only / 18.9 / 23.6
...Other channel only / 20.6 / 24.3
Migration duration / 12.1 / 6.2
Observations 568 146 716 164
Notes: Sample restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. Samples of non-migrants are composed
of non-migrant members from migrant households. χ2 test for the equality of distributions for categorical variables, t-test
for the equality of means for continuous variables between non-migrant and migrant samples.
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
more similar to those of the members of their origin household. Migrants at both destination
are more likely to have koranic education. Most migrants are either a child or sibling of the
origin household head, the eldest one in a vast majority of cases. Finally, note that our survey
mostly captures permanent migration since the average duration of stay ranges from 6 years in
Mauritania to 12 years in Europe. Part or totality of the costs associated to migration were
covered through family funding for respectively 60.5% and 52.1% of the migrants in Europe and
Mauritania.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on earnings and remittances. PPP-adjusted earnings of
working migrants are unsurprisingly much lower in Mauritania than in France and Italy, and
higher in all three destination countries than PPP earnings of non-migrants. 77% of migrants
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Table 2: Individual earnings and remittances by migrant’s location
France/Italy Mauritania
Non-migrants Migrants t/χ2 Non-migrants Migrants t/χ2
Earnings
Labour status (%)
...Unemployed/Non-working 46.9 20.1
25.1***
44.8 15.7
49.4***
...Working 53.1 79.9 55.2 84.3
Monthly earnings 92,690.6 1,255.7 / 59,048.7 78,326.4 /
Monthly earnings (PPP) 301.8 1,420.5 1,118.7*** 192.3 407.8 215.5***
Remittances
Propensity (%)
...to any household / 87.1 / 79.1
...to origin household / 84.4 / 76.7
Frequency (%)
...Monthly / 63.8 / 59.7
...Bimonthly/Quarterly / 10.3 / 12.7
...Less frequently / 25.9 / 28.6
Use (%)
...Daily consumption / 83.6 / 88.1
...Education/Health / 10.6 / 5.6
...Other / 5.8 / 6.3
Targeted expenditures (%)
...Collective / 79.5 / 84.1
...Private / 11.1 / 11.8
...Both / 9.4 / 4.1
Monthly remittances (XOF) / 141,701.6 / 39,689.5
Observations 568 146 716 164
Notes: Sample restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. Sample of non-migrants are composed
of non-migrant members from migrant households. χ2 test for the equality of distributions for categorical variables, t-test for
the equality of means for continuous variables between non-migrant and migrant samples. Earnings are expressed in euros for
France and Italy, in XOF for Senegal (656 XOF = 1 euro) and in MRO for Mauritania (388 MRO = 1 euro). PPP refers to
USD Purchasing Power Parity amounts, using the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank (2009).
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
in Mauritania and 84% in Europe send remittances to their origin household in Senegal, most of
the time on a regular monthly basis. While remittances from Mauritania are significantly lower
than remittances from France and Italy, they amount on average to a larger share of migrants’
income (around 30% in Mauritania and 15% in France and Italy). Remittances amounts are
quite substantial compared to average earnings in Senegal. They represent on average 24% of
the monthly earnings of the origin household. More than 80% of remittances are targeted to
the household as a whole in order and spent on daily consumption.
Overall, these statistics highlight the strength of the link between migrants and their ori-
gin household and lend further credence to our model of migration as a household welfare-
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maximizing strategy.
5 Econometric specification
In this section we turn to the three-step estimation of our model, following the procedure
described in section 3. We now discuss in more details the empirical specifications and sources
of identification at each stage.
5.1 Intra-household selection equation
The reduced-form estimation of the intra-household conditional logit model of location choices
(equation (14)) is conducted on the whole sample of migrants and non-migrant members from
their origin households. The migrant sample is restricted to working-age individuals, i.e aged
18-59, at the time of the surveyed migrant’s departure24. All members of origin households
aged between 18 and 59 years at the time of the surveyed migrant’s departure are considered
as potential migrants25. Two possible destinations are considered: Europe (pooling France
and Italy) and Mauritania. The household is faced with several location choice alternatives,
depending on the number of potential migrants in the household, each corresponding to sending
one member abroad, either in Europe or in Mauritania, and having all other members stay in
Senegal.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for the chosen (observed) allocation of
household members. The vector xi of independent variables includes gender, age and a set
of dummy variables indicating three different levels of formal education: elementary, middle
and high school and above. These variables are expected to affect earnings potentials at each
location according to the standard Mincer framework. In line with our model, and in order
to test the role of both earnings and remittances differentials on intra-household selection into
migration, we add to the initial set of explanatory variables three additional dummy variables
for koranic schooling, being the eldest child and being the eldest sibling of the household head26.
24To focus the analysis on labor migration and selection within the origin household with respect to earnings
and remittances outcomes, we also drop from the sample individuals born in the host country, those who migrated
to study abroad and non-working women who migrated for family reasons (adding up to 3.2% of the sample).
25This definition does not account for potential changes in the household structure since the observed migration
episode. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to reconstruct the exact composition of the origin household
at the time of migration. The household set of relevant alternatives is thus made of all working-age members at
the time of the surveyed migrant’s departure who are still members of the household at the time of the survey.
26Among surveyed household members.
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We indeed expect those variables to have no or limited impact on earnings but to be relevant
determinants of remittances behavior. First, koranic schooling is expected to capture a higher
commitment to the prevailing solidarity norms conveyed by the islamic religion27. Second,
the two eldest dummies account for the fact that first-born children in the Senegalese society
traditionally bear a greater responsibility for providing for their household28.
Note that all independent variables are measured at the individual level and are thus
alternative-specific. Therefore, identification relies on within-household variations in members’
individual characteristics. Yet, we allow the parameters on these variables to vary across desti-
nations by interacting them with destination-specific dummy variables. The reduced-form pa-
rameters that are estimated at this stage capture the overall effect of individual characteristics
on intra-household selection through earnings differentials, remittances potentials and tastes.
The next two steps aim at disentangling the relative role of these channels in the household
allocation decision.
The first-step estimation results are indeed used to compute location choice probabilities phij
that are added to the second-step earnings and remittances equations in order to correct for
endogenous selection in a given location. Robust identification at this second stage consequently
relies on the inclusion in the first-step regression of at least one variable that explains location
choices but does not affect earnings nor remittances. Following Munshi (2003) and Pugatch
and Yang (2010), we exploit rainfall as an exogenous source of variation in emigration from
Senegal29. Due to differential costs of migration to alternative destination countries, rainfall
are expected to additionally affect the choice of a specific location. In the Senegalese context
under study, migration to European countries is indeed much more costly than migration to
Mauritania, which is a neighbouring country that imposes very few restrictions on the circulation
27Using the same dataset,Chort et al. (2012) analyze the influence of solidarity norms conveyed by migrant
networks on the remittances behavior of Senegalese migrants. They point out the significant impact of koranic
schooling on both the probability to remit and remitted amounts.
28Note that the eldest dummies may capture the simultaneous effect of being the eldest, and being a child or
sibling of the household head. However, almost 80% of migrants are a child or sibling of the head. Identification
thus mostly relies on the variability in birth order among surveyed siblings. On the issue of intergenerational
relationships and the role of age and primogeniture in the Senegalese society, see Antoine (2007).
29Indeed, as shown by the above mentioned study in the Mexican context, precipitations in origin regions
are expected to affect emigration flows through different channels, their net effect being context-dependent: on
the one hand, lower-than-average precipitations may damage local economic conditions and generate or increase
incentives to emigrate; on the other hand, the induced negative shock on household income may also negatively
impact propensities to emigrate if migration is costly and households are credit-constrained. Note that rainfall
can affect migration from both rural and urban areas through direct and indirect channels. Indirect channels
include for instance increases in food prices due to lower returns in the agricultural sector.
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of Senegalese.
Rainfall data come from gridded datasets of monthly precipitations matched with our
household-level survey data in Senegal thanks to recorded GPS coordinates30. We compute
local precipitation deviations from long-term averages to obtain normalized yearly precipitation
variables or z-scores defined as observed precipitations minus the long term average (1970-2009),
divided by the long-term standard deviation. The average z-score over the 5 years preceding
the surveyed migrant’s year of departure is then added to the set of explanatory variables in
the first-step selection equation31. Identification is first achieved through both local and yearly
variations in precipitations. Besides, since rainfall variations simultaneously affect all members
of the same household, z-scores are interacted with individual characteristics to further identify
differential effects on the intra-household probability to migrate. We can reasonably argue that
precipitations in the home country have no impact on earnings at destination. Moreover, since
estimation relies on past levels of precipitations at the time of realized migration, we additionally
argue that rainfall variables do not affect current earnings in Senegal nor current remittances
from abroad32.
5.2 Earnings and remittances equations
In a second step, we estimate earnings and remittances equations on the samples of migrants and
non-migrant members of their origin households, using Mincer-type specifications (9), (10) and
(11). We run separate OLS regressions for each of the three locations (Europe, Mauritania and
Senegal). Dependent variables are, respectively, the log of monthly earnings in Senegal and the
log of monthly earnings and remittances in destination countries33. Remittances amounts are
expressed in CFA francs (FCFA). For comparison purposes, earnings amounts in all countries
are expressed in U.S. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars34. This conversion is also needed in
the third-step estimation where predicted earnings differentials between locations are allowed
30We use data published by the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia: http://www.cru.uea.
ac.uk/fr. Worldwide and historical rainfall records (1901-2009) are provided at a 5 degree latitute/longitude
resolution.
31We therefore additionally assume that the timing of migration is exogenous in our setting.
32This last assumption is nonetheless debatable in the case of very recent migration episodes. Our results are
however robust to the exclusion of recent migrants (less than 3 years) from the sample.
33Monthly earnings in Europe include labor income and social benefits.
34We use the conversion factors published by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators. PPP fac-
tors for private consumption in 2009 (country currency units buying the same amount of consumption goods
as 1 USD in the U.S.) were 0.85 for Italy, 0.92 for France, 143.03 for Mauritania and 307.12 for Senegal
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PRVT.PP).
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to affect intra-household location choices. To expand the range of predicted earnings and
remittances, we keep in the sample individuals who reported zero amounts35.
The basic specifications include the following independent variables xi/xk: gender, age and
age squared, education level, koranic schooling and eldest dummies. Migrants’ earnings at desti-
nation and non-migrants’ earnings in Senegal are additionally included in remittances equations
in order to identify proxies for low values of the δi parameter, that is to say, characteristics that
affect remittances amounts conditional on earnings. .
In order to correct for selection in a given location, we add to the set of explanatory variables
a function λ(phij) of choice probabilities obtained from the first-step estimation. In practice, we
choose to take a second order polynomial of the predicted first-best choice probability36. Since
the “true” selection probabilities are unknown, standard errors are bootstrapped to account for
the extra sampling variability caused by using estimates.
5.3 Structural model of intra-household location choices
Unbiased parameter estimates from the second step are used in the third step to identify the
effect of expected earnings and remittances differentials on the probability of being selected
as a migrant within the household. In this third step, we impute counterfactual earnings
and remittances for each member at each location, that is to say, for migrants, had they not
migrated or migrated elsewhere, and for non-migrants, had they migrated abroad. Imputed
earnings differentials between destination and home countries are first included as alternative-
specific explanatory variables in the structural form of the conditional logit model from equation
(17). Additional control variables include gender, age, koranic schooling, eldest dummies, above
defined rainfall variables and their interactions with destination-specific dummies, in order to
account for any non-wage determinant of location choices. As above noted, the koranic and
eldest dummies may capture both the impact of tastes and the role of remittances potential in
the intra-household selection process. To disentangle the remittances and tastes channels, we
add to the initial specification interaction terms between the koranic and eldest dummies and
35An issue raised by this sample definition is that we do not properly take into account additional selection
on the labour market and into remittances. Bertoli et al. (2013) jointly model individual migration and working
decisions. Within our household framework, dealing with both issues would nevertheless add to much theoretical
complexity and is empirically hindered by the limited size of our sample.
36Note that in our setting, the first-best choice probability is similar to the selection probability for migrants
and to a retention probability for stayers, since it corresponds to the probability that the latter were not selected
as migrants within the household.
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imputed remittances amounts. Standard errors are again bootstrapped to correct for the extra
sampling variability in imputed variables.
Identification at this stage is first achieved through within-household variations in earnings
and remittances realizations. Yet, it more crucially depends on the exclusion from the structural
model of selection of at least one variable that enters the earnings and remittances equations.
We argue here that formal education affects earnings and remittances but not location choices,
once earnings and remittances are accounted for. This might not be the case if, for instance,
households benefit directly from having an educated member at home, through externalities
on other members. Moreover, educated individuals could have preferences for migrating to
countries where the average level of education is higher. Finally, migration costs could vary
across education levels. However, it is not clear whether the overall non-wage utility gains or
losses from the migration of an educated member should be large. We can reasonably argue
that the direct effect of education on location choices is negligible compared to its indirect
effect through expected earnings and remittances. Both De Vreyer et al. (2010) and Bertoli
et al. (2013) indeed find that education plays a limited role in shaping migration decisions once
earnings are accounted for. They conclude that selection with respect to education is mainly
explained by expected wage differentials. Although some bias might remain, the above-specified
structural model allows us to consistently identify the structural parameters of interest α and
β without resorting to ad-hoc non-linear functional forms.
6 Results
This section presents estimation results from each step, focusing in particular on the relative
role of earnings and remittances in the migration decision.
6.1 Step 1: Intra-household selection
Table 3 reports estimation results from the first-step reduced-form conditional logit model of
location choices with two migration alternatives (Europe and Mauritania). Specification (1)
includes the basic set of individual regressors and the koranic schooling and eldest dummies.
Specification (2) includes rainfall z-score interactions as additional determinants of migration
decisions.
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Estimated coefficients on gender and age are respectively positively and negatively significant
for both destination alternatives, though they are slightly larger for the European one. Being
a men and relatively younger therefore increases the probability of being selected as a migrant
within the household, whatever the chosen location. Some differences between locations are
however observed with respect to education. Educated individuals (above the elementary level)
have a higher propensity to be in France or Italy than individuals who never went to school.
This positive effect is also found to increase with the level of education. Education is however a
weaker determinant of selection in Mauritania. Overall, these findings are in line with the usual
results derived from self-selection models. In addition, koranic education and eldest dummies
are found to be important determinants of intra-household selection into migration. The positive
coefficients on these variables are fairly large and highly significant.
Results from specification (2) show that rainfall are additional relevant determinants of mi-
gration decisions. Indeed, Wald tests for the joint significance of rainfall variables interacted
with individual characteristics, reported at the bottom of Table 3, prove highly significant for
both locations. Positive shocks on the level of precipitations seem to accentuate the above
described patterns of intra-household selection according to gender and age, and to a lesser
extent to education and eldest dummies in Europe. They also seem to foster migration of mem-
bers with high school education to Mauritania37. To the extent that rainfall measured at the
time of the migrant’s departure can reasonably be excluded from current earnings and remit-
tances equations, interactions between rainfall and individual characteristics can instrument for
selection in the second step of our estimation procedure.
Note that the reduced-form parameters at this stage identify the joint effect of individual
characteristics on intra-household selection through overall differentials in individual earnings,
remittances and benefits or costs of migration. The next two steps thus aim at disentangling
these channels.
37Note that since rainfall simultaneously affects all members of the same household, we cannot draw any
clear conclusion about its overall effect on migration that cannot be identified through our within-household
estimation procedure. Only its differential effect according to individual characteristics can be assessed and is
anyhow relevant for the matter at hand.
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Table 3: Intra-household location choices - Reduced-form conditional logit estimates
Without rainfall With rainfall
France/Italy Mauritania France/Italy Mauritania
(1) (2)
Male (d) 1.018*** 0.418** 1.472*** 0.615***
(0.243) (0.210) (0.368) (0.309)
Age -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.029** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Elementary school (d) 0.477 0.390 0.423 0.526
(0.356) (0.279) (0.442) (0.367)
Middle school (d) 1.420*** 0.866*** 1.252** 0.587**
(0.375) (0.321) (0.504) (0.281)
High school and more (d) 2.667*** 0.610* 3.530*** 0.912*
(0.356) (0.369) (0.602) (0.542)
Koranic school (d) 0.713** 1.754*** 0.598** 2.785***
(0.289) (0.324) (0.297) (0.414)
Oldest child (d) 1.185*** 1.033*** 1.574*** 1.007***
(0.210) (0.216) (0.312) (0.318)
Oldest brother/sister (d) 1.297*** 1.690*** 1.221*** 1.733***
(0.364) (0.312) (0.444) (0.381)
Rainfall z-score x Male 0.854** 0.728**
(0.425) (0.361)
Rainfall z-score x Age -0.013* -0.026**
(0.007) 0.011)
Rainfall z-score x Elementary -0.209 -0.321
(0.392) (0.458)
Rainfall z-score x Middle -0.315 -0.296
(0.458) (0.452)
Rainfall z-score x High 1.095* 1.737**
(0.659) (0.698)
Rainfall z-score x Koranic 0.436* 0.111
(0.256) (0.387)
Rainfall z-score x Oldest child 0.656* 0.122
(0.374) (0.383)
Rainfall z-score x Oldest brother/sister -0.157 -0.281
(0.492) (0.424)
Destination dummy yes yes
Observations 1,594 1,567
Wald test for joint significance of rainfall variables 31.02*** 19.22**
p-value 0.006 0.046
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. Dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if member i of household h lives in country j. (d) stands for dummy variables. Reference category for education
is no schooling. Rainfall z-scores refer to yearly deviations from the 1970-2009 trend period and correspond to the average
z-score over the five years previous to the reported date of migration. Coefficients reported, standard errors in brackets.
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
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6.2 Step 2: Earnings and remittances
Tables 4 and 5 provide estimation results of individual earnings and remittances equations at
each location. Uncorrected regressions refer to standard Mincer-type specifications, whereas
corrected ones additionally include a correction term specified as a second order polynomial
function λ(phij) of the first-best selection probability obtained from step 1, specification (2).
As regards earnings, men unsurprisingly tend to earn significantly more than women, with a
wage premium of around 130% in each location. We also find positive but decreasing marginal
returns to potential experience (for which age is a proxy), although only marginally significant
in Mauritania. Positive returns to education are somewhat larger in destination countries than
in Senegal. An interesting result is that returns to education are particularly large in Europe for
migrants who have at least a high school degree (around 130%) and in Mauritania for migrants
who have a middle school degree (around 80%)38. To the extent that earnings differentials
are taken into account in the household decision, this finding is consistent with the first-step
selection results.
Estimation results of remittances equations provide further insights into the determinants of
household location decisions. Unsurprisingly, remitted amounts from each destination country
are found to increase with migrants’ earnings and to decrease with non-migrants’ earnings. An
increase of 100 PPP US dollars in migrants’ income corresponds to an increase in remitted
amounts of 20% for Europe and 30% for Mauritania. Men tend to remit larger amounts than
women, from 25% in Europe to 100% in Mauritania. Everything being equal, migrants with
education above high school in Europe and migrants with middle education in Mauritania are
found to remit significantly larger amounts. These results are consistent with our theoretical
prediction that remittances potential play a role in the household selection process and might
account for the first-step selection results.
Conditional on earnings, the koranic schooling and eldest dummies are found to be strong
and significant determinants of individual remittances behaviors. Migrants with koranic school-
ing remit on average larger amounts (+35% for migrants in Europe and +53% for migrants in
Mauritania). The same proves true for the eldest child dummy (+32% in Europe and +25% in
38Note that since overall samples include individuals with zero earnings, the large point estimates additionally
point out the relatively lower participation to the labour market of women and individuals with less experience
and low levels of education.
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Table 4: Individual earnings equations - OLS estimates
Dependent variable: Senegal France/Italy Mauritania
Log of monthly Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
earnings, PPP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male (d) 1.541*** 1.579*** 1.347** 1.258** 1.314*** 1.283***
(0.226) (0.198) (0.672) (0.623) (0.451) (0.362)
Age 0.245*** 0.297*** 0.362** 0.394** 0.121* 0.136*
(0.042) (0.061) (0.172) (0.197) (0.069) (0.078)
Age squared (/100) -0.286*** -0.322*** -0.483* -0.496* -0.067 -0.075
(0.067) (0.039) (0.275) (0.295) (0.112) (0.114)
Elementary school (d) 0.495*** 0.568*** 0.621 0.588 0.479* 0.385*
(0.158) (0.197) (0.954) (0.895) (0.283) (0.228)
Middle school (d) 0.426** 0.456** 0.665* 0.592* 0.934** 0.823***
(0.212) (0.221) (0.387) (0.346) (0.469) (0.309)
High school and more (d) 0.254* 0.174* 1.403*** 1.250** 0.327 0.509
(0.141) (0.104) (0.519) (0.611) (0.478) (0.563)
Koranic schooling (d) 0.094 0.033 -0.301 -0.292 -0.326 -0.447
(0.122) (0.146) (0.543) (0.524) (0.417) (0.513)
Oldest child (d) 0.113 0.145 0.226 0.311 0.317 0.208
(0.241) (0.269) (0.452) (0.624) (0.296) (0.163)
Oldest brother/sister (d) 0.222 0.315 0.359 0.265 0.104 0.071
(0.432) (0.468) (0.658) (0.567) (0.165) (0.159)
Constant -3.399*** -4.568*** -3.457** -3.864** -3.962** -4.112**
(0.758) (0.871) (1.612) (1.804) (1.917) (2.025)
First-best probability 1.887** -1.658* -1.122*
(0.947) (1.006) (0.677)
First-best probability2 -1.492* 1.915 0.956
(0.894) (2.154) (0.789)
Observations 1,248 1,248 141 141 160 160
R2 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.24
Wald test for λ(phij) 7.52** 3.25 4.21
p-value 0.03 0.17 0.12
Notes: Samples are restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. (d) stands for dummy
variables. Reference category for education is no schooling. PPP refers to USD Purchasing Power Parity amounts, using
the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank (2009). Coefficients reported, bootstrapped standard
errors in brackets (1000 replications) for corrected specifications.
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
Mauritania) and the eldest sibling dummy (+42% in Europe and +45% in Mauritania). By con-
trast, these variables are found to have no impact on individual earnings, whatever the location
considered. In light of the results from the first-step, showing higher migration probabilities for
individuals having koranic education and being the eldest child or sibling of the household head,
these results suggest that expected remittances play a role in the household allocation decision,
together with earnings differentials. In line with our theoretical framework, these results imply
that koranic and eldest dummies may proxy for low values of the δi parameter.
Finally, note that corrected and uncorrected coefficients in earnings and remittances equa-
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Table 5: Individual remittance equations - OLS estimates
Dependent variable: France/Italy Mauritania
Log of monthly Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
remittances, FCFA (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant’s earnings (/100) 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.278*** 0.321***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Origin household’s earnings (/100) -0.005** -0.004** -0.019* -0.033*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.017)
Male (d) 0.158* 0.247* 1.105** 1.092**
(0.093) (0.146) (0.551) (0.528)
Age 0.043** 0.040* 0.025 0.024
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Age squared (/100) -0.102 -0.098 -0.154 -0.178
(0.286) (0.292) (0.223) (0.239)
Elementary school (d) 0.326 0.422 0.487 0.389
(0.571) (0.607) (0.625) (0.597)
Middle school (d) 0.431 0.396 0.362* 0.389*
(0.582) (0.457) (0.217) (0.212)
High school and more (d) 0.245* 0.283* 0.126 0.159
(0.134) (0.156) (0.257) (0.284)
Koranic schooling (d) 0.312** 0.348** 0.497** 0.526**
(0.139) (0.162) (0.241) (0.247)
Oldest child (d) 0.295* 0.321** 0.224** 0.248**
(0.163) (0.156) (0.111) (0.123)
Oldest brother/sister (d) 0.394 0.415* 0.436* 0.452*
(0.229) (0.247) (0.259) (0.271)
Constant -2.128* -2.156* -1.057* -0.894*
(1.252) (1.283) (0.587) (0.509)
First-best probability -0.954** -0.687
(0.465) (0.663)
First-best probability2 1.257 0.879
(1.356) (1.102)
Observations 138 138 157 157
R2 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.24
Wald test for λ(phij) 5.18* 3.96
p-value 0.08 0.13
Notes: Samples are restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. (d) stands for dummy variables.
Reference category for education is no schooling. Earnings are expressed in PPP and refer to monthly amounts. PPP
refers to USD Purchasing Power Parity amounts, using the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank
(2009). Coefficients reported, bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (1000 replications) for corrected specifications.
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
tions are very close in magnitude, suggesting that the selection bias is not large. This finding
is consistent with the fact that the Dahl’s correction function is not significant in most of our
specifications39. We however reject the null hypothesis for home earnings and remittances from
39InDahl (2002) the correction function is significant at the 5% level in only two thirds of the regressions.
Similar patterns are found in Bertoli et al. (2013) and De Vreyer et al. (2010). Robustness to alternative
specifications of the correction function was tested. All yield similar results so that we finally kept the one that
best fits the data. Note that all earnings and remittances specifications achieve satisfactory goodness-of-fit. R2
indeed ranges from 20% to 30%.
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Europe. The third step is thus based on counterfactual earnings and remittances predictions
using parameters corrected for selection in each location. Robustness to the use of uncorrected
predictions is nevertheless tested.
6.3 Step 3: Structural-form model of intra-household location choices
Table 6 reports the third-step estimation results of our conditional logit model of location choices
in its structural form40. Consistent with our theoretical framework and based on counterfactual
earnings and remittances predictions from the previous step, the main independent variables of
interest are imputed individual earnings differentials between home and destination countries
and imputed remittances amounts.
Specifications in columns (1) and (2) investigate the respective role of expected earnings and
other individual characteristics that aim at capturing the non-wage determinants of migration
in the household decision. Unsurprisingly, results show that earnings differentials play a major
role in shaping intra-household selection patterns. The estimated effect is indeed positive and
highly significant across the two specifications, using as independent variables either uncorrected
or selectivity-corrected counterfactual earnings predictions. As above mentioned, this finding
accounts for the higher migration propensities of household members with middle education level
to Mauritania and high education level to Europe, where they have larger returns. Consistent
with our theoretical framework, this result therefore suggests that the origin household selects
into migration the member with the highest comparative advantage in earnings across locations
in order to maximize the total (earnings) surplus.
Yet, while controlling for earnings, most of the coefficients on individual control variables
are still significant. These findings suggest that non-wage components are additional crucial de-
terminants of intra-household migration decisions. First, men and relatively younger household
members have higher probabilities of being located abroad. More importantly, the same pattern
is observed for individuals with koranic education and who are the eldest child or sibling of the
origin household head. Besides, the point estimates of the effect of these three variables is fairly
large in comparison to that of the other controls. In line with the estimation results of remit-
tances equations at the previous step, this central result points out the fact that, conditional
40We do not report coefficients on rainfall variables since they present similar patterns to those from step-1
reduced-form specification.
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on earnings, individuals with a higher propensity to remit (with a low value of δi) have a higher
probability of being selected as migrants within the household. This result is furthermore fully
consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.
However, two important limitations might challenge the latter interpretation. First, as ex-
tensively discussed in the previous sections, the reduced-form parameters on individual charac-
teristics capture at this stage a potential simultaneous effect of tastes and remittances potentials.
A possible alternative interpretation of the observed patterns of selection with respect to the
koranic schooling and eldest dummy variables is that these individual characteristics account
for differential costs or benefits of moving abroad41. For instance, religious networks at desti-
nation may lower the cost of migrating abroad and therefore foster migration of members with
koranic schooling. Besides, eldest members’s weight in the household decision-making process
may be larger and as a consequence, they may be more likely to “self-select” or be selected as
the first link in the migration chain. Hence, to disentangle the respective role of remittances
potentials and tastes in the selection process, we include as additional explanatory variables
imputed remittances amounts as well as interaction terms with the koranic schooling and eldest
dummy variables. Indeed, as suggested by our theoretical model, to the extent that the latter
variables proxy for low values of the remittances discount factor δi and therefore accurately cap-
ture the role of remittances potentials, their effect positively interacts with remitted amounts.
We should thus empirically observe heterogeneity in the effect of remittances with respect to
those individual characteristics: the lower δi, the higher the propensity to remit and the higher
the role of remittances in determining location choices. Results are given in Table 6, columns
(3) and (4). First, all the coefficients on remitted amounts and the relevant interaction terms
are found to be positive and (highly) significant. Second, the point estimates of the direct effect
of the koranic schooling and eldest dummy variables substantially drop and become marginally
significant. Overall, even if we cannot rule out that part of the effect of our variables of in-
terest may be due to differential tastes, these additional results lend further support to the
hypothesis that the higher propensities of members with koranic schooling and being the eldest
child or sibling of the household head to be located abroad are mainly explained by their higher
remittances potential.
41Indeed, Bertoli et al. (2013) point out the fact that the inverse taste component −xiφj of the household
utility could alternatively be interpreted as the net cost of migration to destination j, which is allowed to vary
according to migrants’ characteristics. In our setting, it includes costs at both household and migrant levels.
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Table 6: Intra-household location choice - Structural-form conditional logit estimates
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings differential, PPP (/100) 0.356*** 0.236*** 0.321*** 0.215***
(0.079) (0.058) (0.055) (0.046)
Remittances, FCFA (/10,000) 0.198* 0.176*
(0.115) (0.103)
Remittances × Koranic 0.126*** 0.118**
(0.042) (0.055)
Remittances × Oldest child 0.092** 0.076**
(0.039) (0.034)
Remittances × Oldest brother/sister 0.109* 0.096*
(0.064) (0.058)
France/Italy
Male (d) 0.327** 0.395* 0.292** 0.338*
(0.162) (0.236) (0.139) (0.199)
Age -0.012** -0.016* -0.010** -0.013*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Koranic school (d) 0.764** 0.628** 0.255** 0.276*
(0.373) (0.291) (0.122) (0.142)
Oldest child (d) 0.976*** 1.271*** 0.523* 0.607
(0.374) (0.485) (0.311) (0.456)
Oldest brother/sister (d) 1.078** 0.969** 0.651* 0.595*
(0.532) (0.478) (0.394) (0.307)
Mauritania
Male (d) 0.222** 0.340* 0.116* 0.195
(0.112) (0.169) (0.068) (0.119)
Age -0.035** -0.042*** -0.031** -0.046**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019)
Koranic school (d) 1.576*** 2.058*** 0.352 0.393
(0.597) (0.785) (0.298) (0.287)
Oldest child (d) 0.913*** 1.302*** 0.552* 0.619*
(0.347) (0.497) (0.328) (0.365)
Oldest brother/sister (d) 1.349*** 1.413*** 0.423* 0.486*
(0.481) (0.509) (0.236) (0.279)
Rainfall variables no yes no yes
Destination dummy yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,594 1,567 1,594 1,567
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. Dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if member i of household h lives in country j. (d) stands for dummy variables. PPP refers to USD Purchasing
Power Parity amounts, using the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank (2009). Coefficients reported,
bootstrapped standard errors in brackets (1000 replications).
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
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A second limitation may arise from the role of welfare weights in our setting. Indeed, ad-
ditional predictions derived from our theoretical model suggest that migration propensities are
positively correlated with bargaining power, so that differential bargaining powers could be an
alternative explanation of the above findings, especially as regards the two eldest dummy vari-
ables. However, two remarks allow us to credibly rule out this alternative interpretation. First,
in our theoretical framework, remittances are expected to decrease with migrants’ bargaining
power. Therefore, if the koranic schooling and eldest dummy variables were only proxy measures
of individuals’ bargaining power, they should negatively affect remitted amounts, which is not
what we observe from the remittances equations estimated in Table 5. Second, as mentioned in
the previous sections, differential welfare weights within the household translate into additional
heterogeneity in the migration decision, especially according to the effect of earnings differen-
tials across locations. Estimations shown in Table 12 in Appendix formally test this hypothesis
by adding interaction terms between predicted earnings differentials and two relevant proxies
for bargaining power, namely age and gender. The results show no evidence of heterogeneity
with respect to age and gender, allowing us to plausibly state that the effect of differential
bargaining powers is quite negligible in our setting42.
In line with the main predictions of our theoretical model, our results therefore support the
idea that both earnings and remittances differentials play a major role in determining household
members’ location choices. These findings have strong implications on migrant selection within
the household: households select into migration members with both the highest comparative
advantages in earnings across locations and with the highest remittances potentials conditional
on earnings. This feature can be observed by modelling the migration decision at the household
level. It is therefore ignored by individual self-selection models whereas we show in this paper
that it allows us to explain the higher migration propensities of household members with koranic
schooling or being the eldest child or sibling of the origin household head although they have
no obvious comparative advantage in earnings.
42To keep the estimation tractable, we only test heterogeneity with respect to earnings differential. Indeed,
additionally testing this hypothesis with respect to remittances potential would imply the inclusion of poorly
identified triple interactions in the relevant specifications.
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7 Conclusion
Although it has been addressed by a large strand of the migration literature, migrant selection
has only been modeled to date as the result of an individual income-maximizing strategy.
However, individual selection models cannot account for most migration patterns observed in
particular in developing countries where migration is part of a household welfare-maximizing
strategy. Therefore, this paper aims at developing a household-based analysis of the selection
process of migrants by investigating the under-explored issue of intra-household selection into
migration.
We first extend the seminal Roy model of self-selection to account for a household-level
decision process for migration. In our framework, a unitary household chooses where to locate
its members based on the maximization of a household utility whose components include home
earnings of non-migrant members and earnings and remittances of migrant members abroad.
Using observed allocation choices of household members, we develop a three-step estimation
procedure to estimate the respective weight on the earnings and remittances components in the
structural intra-household selection decision. We provide an empirical application using survey
data on a unique matched sample of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Mauritania and
their origin household in Senegal.
Our results show that, together with earnings, remittances differentials play a significant
role in shaping intra-household selection patterns. Once controlling for earnings differentials,
we find that households are more likely to select into migration members with the highest
remittances potential in order to maximize the household welfare. These results complement
and enrich those derived from individual-level selection models which do not account for the
household dimension of the migration decision and ignore the role of expected remittances on
migration decisions. Our framework is especially relevant in explaining the observed higher
migration propensities of individuals with koranic schooling or being the eldest child or sibling
of the origin household head although they have no obvious comparative advantage in earnings
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Appendices
A Optimal amount of remittances
Any optimal amount of remittances sent by the migrant member to her origin household to
maximize the total household utility function should satisfy the following f.o.c:
∂Uhij
∂Rij
=
∑
k 6=i
θk
(n− 1)U
′
k
(∑
k 6=i Yks +R
∗
ij
(n− 1)
)
− θiδiU ′i
(
Yij − δiR∗ij
)
= 0
To further determine how the optimal amount R∗ij varies with other exogenous parameters
in the model, we can simply differentiate the above equality with respect to each component:∑
k 6=i
[
1
(n− 1)U
′
k(.)
]
dθk +
∑
k 6=i
[
θk
(n− 1)2U
′′
k (.)
]
dYks +
∑
k 6=i
[
θk
(n− 1)2U
′′
k (.)
]
dR∗ij
=
[
δiU
′
i (.)
]
dθi +
[
θi(U
′
i (.)− δiR∗ijU
′′
i (.))
]
dδi +
[
θiδiU
′′
i (.)
]
dYij −
[
θiδ
2
i U
′′
i (.)
]
dR∗ij
For any concave and twice differentiable individual utility functions, implying U
′
(.) > 0 and
U
′′
(.) < 0, it is then straightforward to show that:
[+]dR∗ij =
∑
k 6=i
[+]dθk
∑
k 6=i
[−]dYks [−]dθi [+]dYij [−]dδi
so that R∗ij can be depicted by the following function of all exogenous parameters:
R∗ij = R
∗
ij(θ
+
k , θ
−
i , Y
−
ks , Y
+
ij , δ
−
i ) ∀i, j and k 6= i
B Optimal value of the household utility function
The (remittance) optimal value of the utility function for household h of locating member i in
destination country j and all other members in the home country s writes:
Vhij =
∑
k 6=i
θkUk
(∑
k 6=i Yks +R
∗
ij
n− 1
)
+ θiUi
(
Yij − δiR∗ij
)
+ Thij
The envelope theorem states that marginal changes in the optimal value of a function with
respect to exogenous parameters of that function can be accurately described by partially dif-
ferentiating the objective function evaluated at its optimum. For any concave and twice dif-
ferentiable individual utility functions, implying U
′
(.) > 0 and U
′′
(.) < 0, and conditional on
tastes, it is then straightforward to show that:
∂Vhij/∂θk = Uk(.) > 0 ; ∂Vhij/∂θi = Ui(.) > 0
∂Vhij/∂Yks = [θk/(n− 1)]U ′k(.) > 0 ; ∂Vhij/∂Yij = θiU
′
i (.) > 0
∂Vhij/∂δi = −θiR∗ijU
′
i (.) < 0
so that Vhij can be depicted by the following function of all exogenous parameters:
Vhij = Vhij(θ
+
k , θ
+
i , Y
+
ks , Y
+
ij , δ
−
i ) ∀i, j and k 6= i
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Table 7: Sample size and composition by country
France Italy Mauritania Pooled
Stage 1: Migrant samples
Number of eligible migrants 579 616 402 1,597
Refusal rate (%) 48.2 51.0 18.9 41.9
Number of surveyed migrants 300 302 326 928
...% of women 24.3 22.9 36.5 28.1
...% in capital/main cities 72.3 48.0 73.0 64.0
Stage 2: Origin household samples
Number of provided contacts 158 114 266 538
Matching rate (%)
... overall 30.7 20.5 53.4 35.3
... among provided contacts 58.2 54.4 65.4 61.0
Number of tracked households 92 62 172 326
...% in Dakar 46.7 54.8 21.3 34.8
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
C Sample representativeness
Additional representative data sources allow us to assess the representativeness of our matched
data at different levels. Using French and Italian census data, we first show that migrant
samples are fairly representative of Senegalese migrant populations in these two host countries.
Unfortunately, we were not able to draw the same analysis for Mauritania for lack of reliable
data. A more serious concern in our setting is the potential sample selection, in both migrant
and household samples, resulting from imperfect matching. Yet, using a simple probit analysis
of matching success, we find no systematic difference between the matched and unmatched
migrant samples, especially regarding our main variables of interest, namely age, gender, formal
and koranic education, link to the origin household head, earnings and remittance amounts.
Furthermore, using data from the nationally representative PSF household survey conducted
in Senegal in 2007 (De Vreyer et al., 2008), we find that our matched migrant households are
quite similar to Senegalese migrant households according to their basic characteristics, and in
particular their size and demographic composition. Sample representativeness tables (Table 8
to 10) are provided below, and a detailed analysis of the representativeness of the matched
samples can be found in Senne (2013). As a consequence, although sample selection issues may
arise as a result of our survey design, they are unlikely to bias our results.
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Table 8: Migrant samples’ representativeness by country - Comparison with OECD data
France Italy
Census MIDDAS Census MIDDAS
Gender (%)
Men 54.7 75.5 88.1 77.3
Women 45.3 25.5 11.9 22.7
Age (%)
20-29 year 20.1 27.6 15.4 23.4
30-39 years 22.3 35.0 49.4 40.5
40-49 years 25.0 21.6 29.2 30.4
50-60 years 20.4 12.6 4.4 5.7
60+ years 12.2 3.2 1.6 0.0
Duration of
stay (%)
up to 5 years 17.5 14.8 29.2 18.9
5 to 10 years 12.2 33.8 26.7 35.1
10+ years 70.3 51.4 44.2 46.0
Citizenship (%)
National 58.6 25.5 1.6 2.3
Other country 41.4 74.5 98.4 97.7
Education (%)
ISCED 0/1/2 45.1 54.6 83.8 48.5
ISCED 3/4 26.9 20.3 12.3 20.1
ISCED 5/6 28.0 25.2 3.9 26.4
Labor force
status (%)
Employed 54.8 74.8 79.5 70.5
Unemployed 12.6 14.1 9.1 21.2
Inactive 32.6 11.1 11.4 8.3
Observations 93,076 286 28,030 299
Notes: OECD census data records information on all individuals born in Senegal, aged 20 and above and living in an
OECD country. MIDDAS sample is restricted to this sub-population population for comparison purpose. ISCED refers
to the International Standard Classification of Education of UNESCO. ISCED 0/1/2 corresponds to no formal education,
primary and lower secondary education; ISCED 3/4 to upper secondary, vocational and technical education; ISCED 5/6
to tertiary education.
Source: DIOC 2005/06, OECD and MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
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Table 9: Probit analysis of matching success
France Italy Mauritania Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant characteristics
Age 0.013*** 0.004 0.008* 0.009***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Gender
Male 0.016 0.043 -0.022 0.000
(0.078) (0.049) (0.076) (0.044)
Female (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Ethnic group
Wolof -0.151** -0.105 0.198** -0.016
(0.069) (0.074) (0.080) (0.045)
Peul -0.082 -0.020 0.063 -0.043
(0.074) (0.075) (0.102) (0.053)
Other (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Religion/Brotherhood
Murid 0.090 -0.064 0.109 0.014
(0.154) (0.143) (0.127) (0.080)
Tidjan -0.015 -0.054 0.141 0.030
(0.139) (0.107) (0.125) (0.080)
Other muslim 0.015 0.206 0.166 0.062
(0.133) (0.264) (0.127) (0.081)
Other (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Koranic schooling
Yes 0.151 -0.025 0.063 0.085
(0.091) (0.067) (0.089) (0.063)
No (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Formal schooling
Elementary/Secondary 0.014 0.016 0.087 0.027
(0.087) (0.081) (0.071) (0.047)
Highschool/University 0.012 0.055 -0.064 0.027
(0.093) (0.084) (0.120) (0.056)
Vocational -0.016 0.142 0.229* 0.056
(0.138) (0.172) (0.134) (0.085)
No formal schooling (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Marital Status
Married -0.069 0.000 -0.062 -0.046
(0.077) (0.061) (0.085) (0.048)
Divorced/Widowed -0.101 -0.099** -0.068 -0.108*
(0.095) (0.041) (0.132) (0.062)
Single (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Time since arrival -0.010** 0.003 -0.006 -0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Place of residence
Capital/Main cities -0.052 -0.077* 0.068 -0.014
(0.072) (0.044) (0.076) (0.038)
Small cities (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Labor status
Working 0.105 0.346** 0.067 0.127
(0.137) (0.162) (0.171) (0.091)
Unemployed 0.221 0.125 0.266 0.240
(0.176) (0.112) (0.182) (0.187)
Non-working (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Income
2nd quartile 0.155 0.124* 0.149 0.139*
(0.102) (0.069) (0.093) (0.081)
3rd quartile -0.052 0.125 0.110 0.086
(0.110) (0.127) (0.101) (0.065)
4th quartile -0.010 0.091 0.252*** 0.164**
(0.110) (0.132) (0.095) (0.070)
Missing 0.080 0.169 -0.336 0.025
(0.201) (0.207) (0.298) (0.119)
1st quartile (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
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Table 9 (continued)
France Italy Mauritania Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Origin household characteristics
Environment
Rural 0.089 -0.052 0.023 0.060
(0.082) (0.050) (0.067) (0.044)
Urban (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Size 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Missing size
Yes 0.084 -0.060 -0.228 -0.046
(0.224) (0.068) (0.294) (0.115)
No (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Resident spouse/child
Yes -0.098 -0.035 0.127* 0.016
(0.075) (0.048) (0.072) (0.042)
No (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Wealth score 0.008 0.038*** 0.010 0.029***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.026) (0.010)
Remittances in cash/kind
Yes -0.104 -0.036 0.033 0.006
(0.111) (0.065) (0.082) (0.048)
No (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Remittances amounts (in euros) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Country
Italy -0.117**
(0.051)
Mauritania 0.255***
(0.056)
France (ref)
Observations 300 302 326 928
Note: Marginal effects at the mean for continuous variables, at 0 for dummy variables. Robust standard errors in brackets.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: MIDDAS survey, 2009-2010. Authors’ calculation.
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Table 11: Origin household characteristics by migrant’s location
France/Italy Mauritania
Household characteristics
Region (%)
...Dakar 53.9 22.1
...North/East 18.1 45.3
...South 3.9 4.7
...Center 24.1 27.9
Environment (%)
...Urban 74.7 64.1
...Rural 25.3 35.9
Composition (%)
...Children (18-) 33.6 38.4
...Adults (18-60) 58.9 56.1
...Elderly (60+) 7.5 5.5
Size 12.8 11.2
Number of international migrants 2.19 1.59
Household head characteristics
Age 58.3 58.4
Gender (%)
...Male 62.9 64.0
...Female 37.1 36.0
Ethnic group (%)
...Wolof 40.2 61.0
...Serere 10.4 9.3
...Peul 16.9 15.1
...Soninke/Mandinka 24.7 1.7
...Diola 4.5 9.3
...Other 3.3 3.5
Religion (%)
...Murid 28.6 26.9
...Tijani 41.6 61.1
...Other 29.8 12.0
Schooling (%)
...No schooling 45.2 64.0
...Primary 18.9 21.5
...Middle School 18.3 9.3
...High School and more 17.6 5.2
Labour status (%)
...Unemployed/Non-working 41.3 51.3
...Working 58.7 48.7
Monthly earnings (XOF) 154,040.2 82,545.9
Monthly earnings (PPP) 501.6 268.8
Observations 146 164
Note: Earnings in XOF for Senegal (659 XOF = 1 euro). PPP refers to USD Purchasing Power Parity amounts, using
the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank (2009).
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
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Table 12: Intra-household location choice - Structural-form conditional logit estimates with
unequal bargaining powers
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings differential, PPP (/100) 0.398*** 0.264*** 0.364*** 0.245***
(0.091) (0.072) (0.083) (0.066)
Earnings differential × Age 0.031 0.022
(0.023) (0.016)
Earnings differential × Male 0.126 0.108
(0.139) (0.114)
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Rainfall variables no yes no yes
Destination dummy yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,594 1,567 1,594 1,567
Notes: Sample is restricted to individuals aged 18-59 at the time of migrant’s departure. Dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if member i of household h lives in country j. (d) stands for dummy variables. PPP refers to USD Purchasing
Power Parity amounts, using the consumption conversion factor published by the World Bank (2009). Individual controls
include gender, age, koranic schooling and eldest dummies. Coefficients reported, bootstrapped standard errors in brackets
(1000 replications).
*p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Source: MIDDAS Survey, 2009 - 2010. Authors’ calculation.
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